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Abstract 
This study clarifies cooperation and compliance in non-equity alliances. Partial least 
squares structural equation modeling findings show how social interaction and risk-based 
reasoning are both facets of interorganizational decision making. In line with the notion that 
behaviors follow intentions, partnersÕ risk-taking tendencies (i.e., intentions to cooperate) and 
compliance tendencies both explain the effort that partners devote to an alliance.  
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1. Introduction  
 As the scope of business collaboration expands, equity-based and non-equity alliances 
intensify (e.g., Gomes, Weber, Brown, & Tarba, 2011). The latter alliance type proliferates, yet 
failure rates are notable: Most alliances fail, even with equity ownership (Das & Teng, 2000), 
and non-equity partnerships have particular difficulty succeeding (Gunasekera, 1997). Part of 
this failure might be due to moral hazard problems (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006), in that partnersÕ 
behaviors rarely are observable, and opportunism costs can be high (Gulati & Singh, 1998). In 
equity alliances, ownership facilitates some control, which incentivizes partners to devote effort 
to making the alliance work (Gulati & Singh, 1998). No such incentives exist for non-equity 
alliances, which creates a need for other mechanisms to engender compliance with the alliance 
agreement and cooperation among the partners (Hardy & Nelson, 1998). 
Despite considerable advances in research into alliance governance, two inherent aspects 
limit relevant knowledge about non-equity alliances. First, research on alliances exhibits various 
focuses on economic and social dimensions. For example, studies with a transaction cost 
perspective emphasize economic dimensions (Oxley, 1997); other authors (e.g., Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994) instead stress social interactions and sense-making processes and relate alliance 
functioning to implicit obligations. These diverging perspectives create a need to clarify the 
economic and social dimensions of a partnerÕs decision to allocate effort to an alliance and 
explain the resulting cooperation and compliance more fully. Second, prior literature lacks 
empirical studies that focus unequivocally on cooperation or compliance in non-equity alliances. 
Without a comprehensive assessment of the theoretical question of what constitutes decision 
making, research cannot explain cooperation or compliance in non-equity alliances effectively.  
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This study focuses on the decision-making processes underlying cooperation and 
compliance in non-equity alliances. The proposed argument is that interorganizational decision 
making encapsulates procedural rationality and social interactions. Cooperation and compliance, 
and thus a partnerÕs decision to expend effort, reflect behavioral decision making and social 
interaction processes.  
2. Model and hypotheses 
The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) specifies that intentions precede 
actual behaviors. A partnerÕs effort implies cooperative and compliance behaviors, including 
tendencies to engage in potentially risky activities or comply with the alliance agreement, which 
then determine the actual effort expended. Building on an adapted notion of reasoned risk-taking 
behavior (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003), this paper advances a model of partnersÕ risk-
taking tendencies that determine cooperation in non-equity alliances. In line with work on social 
dilemmas and compliance behaviors (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986), the model depicts partnersÕ 
compliance tendencies. Intentions to cooperate and to comply within the alliance ultimately 
shape partnersÕ actual effort.  
The argument of reasoned risk taking (Carpenter et al., 2003) emphasizes the context 
specificity of such behaviors. As Sitkin and Pablo (1992) posit, risk-taking tendencies differ with 
varying conditions. The proposed model adopts three characteristics delineated by Sitkin and 
Pablo (1992): (1) partner characteristics, including perceived risk and risk-taking propensity; (2) 
decision context characteristics, which relate to the situation in which the decision to expend 
effort occurs; and (3) parent characteristics, including sunk costs that may result from 
investments in the alliance and cultural risk values. By studying these characteristics, this study 
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examines the processes underlying the decision to devote effort even if the payoff is risky, which 
shapes cooperation in non-equity alliances.  
Because an alliance is a social contract (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), partners should not 
act in self-interested ways (e.g., Das & Teng 1998) but rather should comply with the alliance 
agreement. In following Brewer and Kramer (1986), this study asserts that such an alliance 
setting represents a social dilemma. For example, reasoned risk-taking tendencies might suggest 
lower cooperative efforts than specified by the alliance agreement, but the partner still might 
comply with the alliance agreement and devote the agreed-on level of effort. The rationale 
underlying this compliance reflects social psychology (Kelman, 1961). Social interaction process 
characteristics influence compliance tendencies, such as the partnerÕs notion of obligation or 
sense of accountability. Through interactions for example, partners might develop an alliance 
identity that in turn influences the partnersÕ sense of obligation to achieve alliance-specific 
objectives and devote appropriate levels of effort, as well as attitudes toward being held 
accountable for dedicating these higher levels of effort and achieving objectives. Partners then 
likely honor their obligations and expend actual effort, despite the apparent costs of doing so. 
Therefore, the proposed model includes the social reasoning underlying compliance and the 
ensuing effort in non-equity alliances. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical arguments, and Table 1 
contains the construct definitions.  
Figure 1 and Table 1 about here 
2.1.  Reasoned risk-taking behavior in non-equity alliances 
2.1.1. Partner characteristics  
The environments in which non-equity alliances operate are not necessarily stable. Change 
can produce uncertainty when it is difficult to predict the future components of the environment 
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(Milliken, 1987). Ring and Van de Ven (1994) suggest that alliances also create behavioral 
uncertainty, such as one partnerÕs difficulty predicting the extent to which the other partner will 
comply with the obligations specified in agreements (i.e., moral hazard). Formally, an alliance 
partnerÕs perceived behavioral uncertainty is that partnerÕs difficulty predicting the other partnerÕs 
effort or fully understanding how that effort will lead to specified objectives. Trust mitigates 
behavioral uncertainty (Das & Teng, 1998). The degree of trust⎯or a partnerÕs confidence that the 
other partner devotes appropriate effort⎯relates negatively to perceived behavioral uncertainty. 
Also, risk influences decision making (Sitkin & Pablo 1992). Perceived risk in non-equity 
alliances, according to Baird and Thomas (1985), is a partnerÕs assessment of how risky the 
particular consequences of effort are, in terms of the extent of uncertainty and confidence in 
conjectures. In an alliance context, perceived risk is a consequence of environmental uncertainty 
and trust in partner effort.  
H1a: The greater the environmental change, the greater a partnerÕs perceived risk.  
H1b: The less predictable the environmental change, the greater a partnerÕs perceived 
risk.  
H1c: The greater a partnerÕs trust, the lower that partnerÕs perceived risk. 
Partners in alliances collaborate to achieve objectives and increase revenues. Agency 
theory suggests that outcome-based revenue sharing mitigates moral hazard potential (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Partners that share revenues, as opposed to arrangements in which one partner 
compensates the other on the basis of expended effort, perceive payoff consequences as more risky 
(Bloom & Milkovich, 1999).  
H1d: With a greater proportion of revenue sharing in alliances, partnersÕ perceived risk 
increases. 
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Risk propensity, which reflects the partnerÕs risk-taking tendencies, also influences effort 
decisions. This studyÕs conceptualization of risk propensity departs from definitions that imagine a 
stable dispositional attribute (Rowe, 1977) and therefore accounts for how the decision context 
affects the propensity to take risks.  
2.1.2. Decision context 
The decision context consists of frames, according to whether the decision signals gains or 
losses. According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), positively framed situations lead 
to risk-averse behavior, whereas negatively framed situations prompt risk-seeking behavior. An 
aspiration reference point also is central to theories of organizational risk-taking behavior (Shoham & 
Fiegenbaum, 2002). Partners in alliances likely define aspiration levels for alliance performance 
objectives. When anticipated performance falls below targeted levels, partners sense a loss context; 
when anticipated performance rises above such levels, partners infer a gain context. 
H2a: A partnerÕs risk-taking propensity in an alliance increases (decreases) with a 
performance loss (gain) frame. 
Partners in non-equity alliances with revenue-sharing agreements similarly may perceive 
losses, because of the challenge associated with satisfying their income objectives. Partners that 
receive compensation for their expended effort within the alliance realize their aspiration level of 
total income without any risk, and this level corresponds to their anticipated overall income 
level. If some proportion of income depends on revenues earned through alliance performance 
though, partners judge the revenue-dependent proportion as risky. The difference between the 
level of income received for expending effort and the overall level of income anticipated from 
the alliance becomes manifest as an implied loss for the partner.  
H2b: A partnerÕs risk-taking propensity in an alliance increases (decreases) with the 
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revenue-sharing loss (gain) frame. 
2.1.3. Parent characteristics 
Three parent firm characteristics affect risk taking in alliances: organizational culture, the 
importance of the alliance, and the level of alliance-specific investments. Investments that are highly 
specific to an alliance, with little external value, represent sunk costs (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
Thaler (1980) argues that sunk costs lead to risk-seeking behavior. 
H3a: The greater a partnerÕs alliance-specific investment, the greater its risk-taking 
propensity in the alliance. 
Organizational tendencies to seek or avoid risk reflect an organizationÕs cultural risk values 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Deal and Kennedy (1982) argue that an organizationÕs cultural risk 
values systematically encourage or discourage risk taking. 
H3b: The greater the overall tendency to take risks within a partnerÕs organizational 
culture, the greater that partnerÕs risk-taking propensity in an alliance. 
Drawing on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), this study includes a 
third parent characteristic to reflect the importance of the alliance to the parent. If the alliance is of 
critical relevance, the partner takes greater risk to meet alliance objectives. That is, risk-taking 
propensity increases with the overall value the parent assigns to the alliance outcomes.  
H3c: The greater the importance of an alliance to a partner, the greater that partnerÕs 
risk-taking propensity in the alliance. 
2.2. Social reasoning in non-equity alliances 
2.2.1. Interaction process characteristics 
The interaction processes underlying social reasoning refer to partnersÕ compliance 
tendencies, as well as their sense of accountability and obligation. Partners in reciprocal exchange 
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arrangements develop implicit understandings about the latter (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). These 
understandings stem from interactions within the alliance (e.g., Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Kelman, 
1961), so partners in non-equity alliances develop a sense of obligation that reflects their impression 
of being obliged to achieve alliance-specific objectives or expend appropriate levels of effort, 
prompted by their explicit or implicit arrangements with partners and the interaction processes.  
Partners also perceive accountability, which involves justifying prior and ongoing 
actions. Accountability arises from a set of established procedures and relationships that vary in 
formality; an alliance member is accountable to its partner in the sense that the former has the 
right to call on the partner to justify agreed activities (Jackson, 1982). External or internal 
institutions, such as contractual agreements, impose such accountability. That is, a partner in a non-
equity alliance forms a sense of accountability, which reflects its assessment of having to justify 
and being held accountable for expending effort or accomplishing objectives.  
Compliance tendency is the third element of the social interactive process. Compliance is 
behavioral adherence to the wishes of an influential source, without necessarily changing attitudes. 
According to Hunt, Mentzer, and Danes (1987), compliance tendency reflects a partnerÕs 
inclination to adhere to obligations and intentions to comply with elements of the alliance 
arrangements. In contrast, a sense of obligation or accountability reflects attitudes, rather than 
intentions. According to the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), attitudes 
influence behavioral intentions, so a partnerÕs senses of obligation and accountability should affect 
its compliance tendencies.  
H4: The greater a partnerÕs sense of (a) obligation and (b) accountability, the greater that 
partnerÕs compliance tendency. 
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2.2.2.  Partner effort 
In accordance with Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), intentions to comply and cooperate precede 
actual behaviors, such as the exertion of effort. Specific to the current study context, partners expend 
greater actual effort to leverage alliance capabilities (Gudergan, Devinney, Richter, & Ellis, 2012), 
when their compliance tendency (i.e., intention to comply) and cooperation tendency, encapsulated in 
their risk-taking inclination (i.e., intention to expend effort despite perceptions of risky consequences 
of that effort), are greater. The latter reveals the related influence of perceived risk and risk-taking 
propensity.  
H5a: The greater a partnerÕs compliance tendency, the greater that partnerÕs effort. 
H5b: Partner effort relates negatively to the perceived risk associated with the 
consequences of that effort. 
H5c: Partner effort relates positively to risk-taking propensity. 
H5d: The positive relationship between risk-taking propensity and partner effort is 
moderated by the perceived risk associated with the consequences of that effort. 
3. Method  
3.1. Sample 
Data about 146 alliances among a sample of 1,500 organizations provide the basis for the 
empirical analysis. The response rate of 10% is suitable for assessing the hypotheses. A follow-
up analysis shows that 29% of nonparticipants did not respond because their firm did not 
currently engage in any non-equity alliance. A comparison of early and late respondents does not 
indicate any significant differences. Therefore, nonresponse bias does not appear to be a concern.  
The key informants are managers with operational responsibility for and knowledge 
about an alliance. They identified one non-equity alliance in which they participated, which 
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served as the point of reference for answering all questions. HarmanÕs ex post one-factor test 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) uncovers no Ògeneral factorÓ in the data. This confirmation implies 
the likely absence of any common method bias. The data quality thus appears sufficient for the 
empirical study. Significant multivariate skew and kurtosis measures (DeCarlo, 1997) indicate 
violations of the normality assumption. 
3.2. Construct measures 
Formative measurement models apply to partner effort, alliance-specific investments, 
sense of accountability, sense of obligation, performance loss/gain context, perceived risk, risk-
taking tendency, compliance tendency, predictability of environmental change, environmental 
change, and trust. The remaining constructsÑcultural risk orientation, revenue sharing, and 
revenue-sharing loss/gain contextÑuse reflective measurement models. The measure of alliance 
importance uses a single item.  
Regarding the reflective measurement models, the CronbachÕs α and composite reliability 
values exceed the .5 threshold for exploratory research, indicating their reliability (Hair, Sarstedt, 
Ringle, & Mena, 2012). The average variance extracted (AVE) exceeds .5, in support of 
convergent validity; each modelÕs AVE is greater than its squared correlation with any other 
model, indicating discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2012). For the formative models, variance 
inflation factors do not exceed 5 (Hair et al., 2012), and the weights are significant and positive. 
Therefore, the measurement models are suitable. 
A confirmatory tetrad analysis (CTA) (Gudergan, Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2008) supports 
the measurement modes, with one exception. The unidimensionality and reliability assessments 
confirm the reflective mode for organizational risk-taking values, but the CTA does not offer 
clear support. The theoretical conceptualization suggests maintaining the reflective mode though.  
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3.3. Estimation method 
This study draws on partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM), in 
PLS-Graph 3.0 (Chin, 2001)Ña well-substantiated method for models of high complexity but 
low theoretical support (Hair et al., 2012). In the relatively underdeveloped field of non-equity 
alliance research, relevant characteristics remain unclear, so this study involves theory building, 
rather than theory testing.  
4. Results  
Table 2 summarizes the results. The predictive constructs explain the dependent 
constructs adequately and provide significant support for most of the hypothesized relationships.  
Table 2 about here 
4.1. Effects on partner effort  
Partner effort results from risk-related behavioral decision-making processes, as well as 
social processes. A partnerÕs effort increases with a greater risk-taking tendency, but the 
perceived risk associated with that effort moderates the effect. That is, the interaction of 
perceived risk and risk-taking propensity (H5d) influences the effort a partner contributes to an 
alliance. Neither perceived risk (H5b) nor willingness to take risk (H5c) matter separately. The 
partnerÕs compliance tendency explains additional variation in the effort expended (H5a).  
Models that attempt to explain partner effort solely on the basis of either risk- or social 
processÐrelated aspects cannot capture all the intricacies. Estimations stemming from alternative 
models that focus on one perspective or their partial aspects explain less variance in partner 
effort. The proposed model of reasoned cooperation and compliance overcomes this limitation 
by addressing both aspects and thereby explaining the determinants of partner effort more 
comprehensively. 
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4.2. Perceived risk  
A partnerÕs perception of the risks that characterize the effort contributed to an alliance 
reflects three factors: unpredictability of environmental change, trust, and level of revenue sharing. 
Environmental change in itself does not influence a partnerÕs perception of risk (H1a); the degree 
to which such change can be predicted matters instead. The unpredictability of environmental 
change thus explains the level of risk associated with the output of effort, as a result of not being 
able to predict changing environmental circumstances (H1b). Trust explains this level of risk as a 
result of confidence in the partnerÕs contributions (H1c). Both general business and alliance-
specific aspects thus influence perceived risks. The level of revenue sharing also has a significant, 
positive effect on perceived risks (H1d), related to the allocation of payoffs to accomplish 
outcomes or encourage the input of effort. This aspect is alliance specific. Although perceived risks 
in non-collaborating organizations result from the unpredictability of environmental change, in 
alliances, both trust and the level of revenue sharing exert additional significant effects.  
4.3. Risk-taking tendency  
A partnerÕs loss/gain context, alliance importance, alliance-specific investment, and 
organizational risk-taking values affect its tendency to take risk. The results support the 
relationship between the revenue sharing loss/gain context and risk-taking tendency (H2b), but 
limited support arises for the relationship between the performance-related loss/gain context and 
risk-taking tendency (H2a). A partnerÕs willingness to take risk in an alliance increases with a 
greater reliance on revenue sharing and, possibly, lower performance levels. The results also 
suggest that a partner takes greater risk when the importance of the alliance (H3c) and alliance-
specific investments (H3a) of the parent are greater. Organizational risk-taking values (H3b) 
have a significant effect on the partnerÕs propensity to take risk. Thus, regardless of the alliance 
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conditions, a partnerÕs organizational culture pre-establishes its tendency to avoid or take risks in 
the alliance.  
4.4. Compliance tendency  
The estimations show that both a partnerÕs sense of accountability (H4a) and sense of 
obligation (H4b) affect its compliance tendency.  
4.5. Summary 
The findings provide partial support for prospect theory and strong support for 
interactional- and social psychologyÐbased perspectives on decision making in alliances, 
including notable substantiation of the hypothesized model of reasoned cooperation and 
compliance in non-equity alliances. A closer examination of the direct, indirect, and total effects 
of the antecedents in this study (see Table 3) reveals that social processes that lead to a tendency 
to comply have a greater effect on the partnersÕ contributions of effort to the alliance than does 
risk-based reasoning. The total effects of a sense of accountability and sense of obligation on 
partner effort are considerably greater than those of any other factor. Also, organizational risk-
taking values have a strong total effect, reflecting the parent-specific state that affects partner 
effort in non-equity alliances. 
Table 3 about here 
5. Discussion  
5.1. Contributions to theory 
This investigation of a theoretical model of reasoned cooperation and compliance in non-
equity alliances supports the thesis that both procedural rationality and social interaction 
processes matter for alliance decision making. The findings provide evidence of influences of 
risk-based and social interaction aspects; both the interaction of risk-taking tendency and 
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perceived risks, as well as compliance tendency, enter alliance decision-making processes that 
determine partnersÕ input of effort. These decision-making processes constitute social rationality. 
The results, which establish the existence of and some insights about the partnersÕ cooperation 
and compliance, as well as their antecedents, support the theory of planned behavior as a means 
to explain decision making in non-equity alliances. The findings are consistent with the adapted 
notion of reasoned risk-taking behavior articulated by Carpenter et al. (2003) and research on 
social dilemmas and compliance behavior (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986).  
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) propose that decision making in risky situations and the associated 
risk-taking behavior depend on several factors; this study offers some empirical support for those 
predictions. For example, characteristics related to the partnerÕs risk perceptions and risk-taking 
propensity matter; decision context characteristics related to the framing of the situation in which 
the decision takes place matter too; and parent characteristics related to perceptions of sunk costs 
that may result from investing in the alliance and the cultural risk values of the parent 
organization make a difference.  
This study offers partial support for prospect theory as a behavioral theory of risky 
decision making. The results indicate significant support for the relationship between a revenue-
sharing loss/gain context and risk-taking tendency but only limited support for that between a 
performance-oriented loss/gain context and this tendency. Prospect theory suggests that sunk 
cost perceptions foster risk taking, and the present results support this notion; alliance-specific 
investment has a significant positive effect on the partnerÕs risk-taking tendency.  
5.2. Managerial implications 
Alliance managersÕ intentions to meet the terms of an alliance agreement relates to their 
willingness to exert effort, even if the outcomes are risky. Some managers might believe or 
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intend to make decisions purely on the basis of their evaluation of risky outcomes, and others 
claim that they always comply with specified agreements, but most combine risk-based 
assessments with a tendency to act in accordance with agreements when determining how much 
effort to devote to an alliance. Managers should expect that partners in a non-equity alliance 
might deviate from agreements, according to their risk-based assessment. Notwithstanding these 
conclusions, social processes underlying compliance have a greater role than the risk-based 
decision-making processes. Thus, alliance managers should seek to manage social dimensions 
within an alliance.  
Building trust in alliances is important; greater confidence in a partner reduces the risk 
associated with devoting effort and increases cooperative behaviors. In turn, positive effects 
accrue for the amount of effort a partner contributes. Managers should behave in ways to 
improve their trustworthiness, as well as interact with others to strengthen their sense of 
obligation and accountability, which should then strengthen compliance. 
5.3. Conclusion 
This study specifies the determinants of cooperation and compliance in non-equity 
alliances. The findings stress the need to understand the components of bounded and social 
rationality in decision-making processes and thus clarify the intricacies of decision making in 
non-equity alliances.  
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Figure 1. Model of reasoned cooperation and compliance in non-equity alliances 
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Table 1. Constructs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
22 
Table 2. Structural model results  
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Table 3. Direct, indirect, and total effects  
 
 
 
 
